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Reflections on the intersection between labour law and corporate law 
 
By Victoria Lambropoulos1 
 
(Work in progress paper prepared for the Corporate Law Teachers’ 
Association Conference held at Deakin University, Stonnington 




Academic scholars in Australia and internationally have been observing 
the intersection and potential merger of corporate law and labour law for 
some time.2 The fields have had varying degrees of impact on each other 
in the areas of corporate governance and labour management.  “[L]abour 
law structures and limits what management can do in its relations with 
employees.”3  How labour is managed also impacts on shareholder 
value.4  International and domestic scholarship has observed that the 
pursuit of shareholder primacy has been linked to “deteriorating outcomes 
                                                 
1 Victoria Lambropoulos; Lecturer in law at Deakin University; Barrister – at – law , 
Victorian Bar 
 
2 see K W Wedderburn, Companies and Employees: Common Law or Social Dimension?, (1993) 109 
LQR 220; H. Hansmann Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, (1993), 43 Uni of Toronto 
Law Journal 589 and Gospel & Pendleton Corporate Governance and Labour Management, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2005 for an international perspective; Australian Scholars include J. Hill 
At the Frontiers of Labour Law and Corporate Law: Enterprise Bargaining, Corporations and 
Employees, (1995) 23 Fed. Law Review Vol 23 at 204; more recently see R. Mitchell, A. O’ Donnell 
and I Ramsay Shareholder Value and Employee Interests: Intersections between Corporate 
Governance, Corporate Law and Labour Law publication of CCLSR and CELR, The University of 
Melbourne 2005 
3 R. Mitchell et al above n2 at p 38 
4 Ibid p6 also see Gospel & Pendleton above n2. 
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for labour”.5 The fields also intersect indirectly during the collective 
enterprise bargaining process. Trade unions have resorted to corporate 
law as a means of pursuing employee concerns in order to obtain 
favourable employment benefits on behalf of employees during a 
collective bargaining period.  These means have also been used outside 
the collective bargaining period.  This method has had mixed results for 
unions. It may however increase in importance since the weakening of the 
ability for trade unions to use the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) to 
collectively bargain introduced by the work choices reforms in 2006.6 
The fields of study also intersect in the area of trade union regulation.  
The new provisions effectively corporatise trade unions. Many of the 
provisions in the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) have a striking 
similarity to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). For example,  trade union 
officials are now subject to the same legal duties as corporate directors 
and office holders as outlined in Chapter 2D of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth).7  
 
                                                 
5 Ibid 
6 Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth), No 153 of 2005, was assented to 14 
December 2005. The bulk of the legislation came into effect 27 March 2006. The amending act entirely 
replaced the existing Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). The Workplace Relations Regulations 
(2006) entirely replaced the 1996 regulations.  
7 The regulation of Trade Unions are found in the Schedule 1 of  the WRA called the Registration and 
Accountability of Organisations Schedule for Conduct of Officers and Employees see Chp 9 of 
Schedule 1. Also see A. Forsyth Trade Union Regulation & the Accountability of Union Office-
Holders: Examining the Corporate Model (2000) 13 Australian Journal of Labour Law p1-22. The 
article is written prior to work choices however the government proposals noted in the paper have been 
replicated in work choices. 
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The fields are however still considered to be “separate fields of legal 
scholarship and regulatory policy” 8, domestically and internationally.9 
This was acutely illustrated in Australia in the area of insolvency in the 
infamous 1998 industrial dispute at the Melbourne docks. The dispute 
involved the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) and Patrick Stevedores 
group of companies.10  The dispute arose when an entire workforce was 
sacked due to a company restructure. All the employees who were 
predominantly union members lost their jobs and their accumulated 
entitlements. The dispute was eventually settled out of court. The 
litigation is complex however observations were made by the High Court 
regarding the intersection between corporate law and labour law, 
essentially maintaining the separation between the two fields. 11 Further, 
the recent reforms to labour law introduced by the work choices 
amendments has ignited this debate towards a merger of the two fields as 
the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) is now almost entirely enacted 
under the corporations power in the Constitution, s51(xx).12
 
                                                 
8 Mitchell et al, above n 2 p 4 
9 see Gospel & Pendleton, above n 2 p1 
10 for a description of the dispute  R. Morris, A watershed on the Australian Waterfront? The 1998 
Stevedoring Dispute (2000)  27 Maritime Policy and Management at p 107 
11 Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1; 153 
ALR 643 at [42] 
12 This was held valid by the High Court State of NSW v Cth (S592/2005); State of WA v Cth 
(P66/2005); State of SA v Cth (A3/2006); State of Qld v Cth (B5/2006); Australian Workers’ Union & 
Anor v Cth (B6/2006); Unions NSW & Orsv Cth (S50/2006); State of Victoria v The 
Commonwealth(M21/2006)  [2006] HCA 52 14 November 2006 
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From a policy perspective how companies “are governed and how labour 
is managed are central issues for all industrial societies. Both have 
implications for economic wealth and for the broader welfare of 
nations”13 How companies are governed and what affect that has on 
labour management and standards is of great public concern. Arguably 
the pursuit of shareholder value to the exclusion of other stakeholders 
such as employees has caused a deterioration of labour standards in 
Anglo-Saxon, countries where, despite the influence of corporate social 
responsibility principles,14 shareholder primacy is still the foundation of 
corporate governance practice.15 This concern should lead scholars to 
examine the impact the fields of study have on each other. This inquiry 
should be of relevance to corporate lawyers as well as labour lawyers.   
 
It is apparent that this is a relevant field of inquiry to the Commonwealth 
government. It is the subject of a significant ARC Discovery project grant 
titled “Corporate governance and workplace partnerships” run by the 
Centre for Corporate Law & Securities Regulation and the Centre for 
Employment & Labour Relations law at the University of Melbourne. It is 
also an area which merges disciplines outside of the law including 
                                                 
13 Gospel & Pendleton see n 2 p1 
14 see M. Jones, S Marshall, R. Mitchell Corporate Social Responsibility and the management of 
labour in two Australian Mining Industry Companies Corporate Governance Vol 15 No. 1 Jan 2007 at 
p57 – 67 Blackwell Publishing. 
15 R. Mitchell et al see n 2; see The Age NAB article (23/1/07) Business Section by NAB Chairman on 
CSR 
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management, economics and human resources.  The paper will draw upon 
scholarship from these disciplines.16  
 
Structure of Paper 
The paper will focus on the relevance to corporate law from a labour 
lawyer’s perspective. It will outline the Australian labour law system and 
discuss the changing redefinition of labour law. It will then examine 
certain aspects of corporate governance that have an influence on labour 
law.  
 
A Brief History of Australian Labour Law 
Australia inherited the British labour master and servant laws and other 
associated laws relating to labour and trade union regulation upon 
settlement. However by federation Australia had given birth to its own 
unique brand of labour law which survived up until work choices which 
came into operation in 2006. Labour lawyers have and will probably in 
the future speak of this period with some nostalgia.17 A brief explanation 
of the system which pre-existed work choices is related to the present 
discussion, as it is helpful to illustrate corporate law’s relevance to 
                                                 
16 see Gospel & Pendleton above n 2 
17 see Isasc & Macintyre The new province for law and order; 100 years of Australian Industrial 
Conciliation & Arbitration, 2004 Cambridge University Press, Melbourne  
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modern labour law. 
 
1901- 2006; The Birth and Death of the Award system based on 
Conciliation & Arbitration  
From federation the federal regulation of labour law in Australia was 
governed by the conciliation and arbitration power in the Federal 
Constitution s51(xxxv). This power gave the federal government the 
power to makes laws with respect to conciliation and arbitration for the 
purpose of settling interstate industrial disputes. The Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission (AIRC) up until 2006 had the exclusive power to 
settle industrial disputes of this nature. The awards determined by the 
commission were binding on the parties to the dispute.  Effectively 
through the award system Australia had a centralised wage fixing system. 
The award system gave trade unions a significant role in this process as 
they were given standing to institute proceedings in the commission and 
represent employees. The resolution of industrial disputes by way of 
conciliation and arbitration was an international trend. Conciliation 
statutes were enacted in Britain, the United States and Canada at about 
the same time as in Australia.18 What was unusual about Australia was 
                                                 
18 R. McCallum The New Work Choices Law: Once Again Australia Borrows Foreign Labour Law 
Concepts (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Labour Law p 98 at 100. In the article he also notes that the 
current reforms are in line with international developments in labour law 
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that the system of conciliation and arbitration was compulsory.19 The 
terms and conditions of labour management were not determined by the 
parties at enterprise level but as determined by the commission. This 
constrained what management could do across many unionised sectors in 
Australia resulting in inflexible and standardised working arrangements. 
Labour law was focused on the activities of the Australian Industrial 
Commission and its determinations as this was the structure of the 
Australian labour system. Corporate governance did not appear to directly 
affect the determination of workers’ rights through the award system. It 
was the process of conciliation and arbitration and the central role played 
by trade unions which influenced labour outcomes. Throughout this 
period trade union membership in Australia was high. 
 
From 1987 onwards the commission “placed increasing emphasis on the 
need to improve the international competitiveness of the Australian 
economy.”20 This reflected the economic reforms of the Hawke/Keating 
government.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s the Hawke/Keating 
governments deregulated the Australian economy and the Australian 
labour marker.  In order for Australia to compete globally it was 
considered that the ability to negotiate flexible working arrangements had 
to be introduced.  At the same time trade union membership in Australia 
                                                 
19 Only New Zealand emulated Australia’s system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration 
20 Breen & Creighton Labour Law, 4th Ed, The Federation Press, 2005 Sydney 
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continued to fall. This trend was also mirrored internationally.  
 
“In 1999, 26% of all employees (1.9 million people) were members of a 
trade union. Levels of trade union membership have dropped 
considerably over recent decades, especially through the 1990s. In 1976, 
close to half (51%) of all employees were members of a trade union. By 
1992 the membership rate had fallen to 40%. After a slowdown in the 
decline around the early 1990s (possibly associated with the 1990-91 
recession), membership rates have plummeted.”21  
  
In 1993 the Keating government introduced reforms using the 
corporations’ power to allow collective bargaining at enterprise level 
which by-passed the commission’s involvement. This signalled the 
beginning of the end of the compulsory centralised labour regulation 
system that had been in operation in Australia since 1901. The Howard 
government continued this reform process. Today the commission has 
been stripped of its centralised wage fixing power and it can no longer 
make new awards. Our labour system today is deregulated and it relies on 
the parties at enterprise level to make agreements relating to the terms 
and conditions of employees. This system is now reliant upon the 
corporations’ power in the Constitution. There are today relatively few 
                                                 
21 Australian Bureau of Statistics; Australian Social Trends 2000. 
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constraints on management’s power to set the terms and conditions of 
employment.  It largely depends on the bargaining process between the 
parties. There is a “general recognition that the shift to enterprise-based 
arrangements coupled with the weakening of the authority of the AIRC 
and trade unions has considerably strengthened managerial 
prerogative”.22  Employees are still able to be represented by trade unions 
in the collectively bargaining process. However the ability of trade unions 
to effectively bargain with employers has been weakened by work 
choices.23  In effect Australian labour law now places little restraint on 
management’s ability to weaken employee benefits and entitlements. 
Managerial prerogative has been strengthened to such a degree that there 
is no compulsion at law upon employers to bargain in good faith or to 
negotiate with trade unions.24 The Australian work force today is subject 
to management’s powers and their pursuit of shareholder value which is 
often applied to the detriment of labour interests.    
 
These changes have arguably been the cause of the shift in focus in labour 
law. No longer is the structure of the labour system based on conciliation 
and arbitration and award-making. The focus of labour regulation in 
                                                 
22 R. Mitchell et al above n 2 p 35. 
23 S McCrystal, ‘Shifting the Balance of Power in Collective Bargaining:  Australian Law, Industrial 
Action and Work Choices’ (2006) 16 Economic and Labour Relations Review 193. 
24 Sensis Pty Ltd v Community and Public Sector Union (2003) 128 IR 92; A full bench of the AIRC 
held that there was no duty on parties in the WRA to bargain in good faith. It is considered that this 
position has not changed in the act in its amended form   
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Australia is now upon enterprise bargaining. The driver of labour 
standards is the bargaining between single enterprises25 and its 
workforce.  The agreements are made collectively in the form of 
collective agreements or individually in the form of Australian workplace 
agreements. The principle difference in today’s labour system is that the 
terms and conditions of Australia’s workforce are generally determined 
without the intervention of a third party. This changes the bargaining 
process significantly and means that labour law scholars must search to 
other areas of legal regulation to protect workers’ rights. 
 
The Role of Labour Law and its place in Corporate Law  
Much has been written both in Australia and in the United Kingdom 
examining the redefinition of labour law.26 The traditional focus of labour 
law is to regulate the contract of employment. Its principal purpose has 
been to “act as a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of 
bargaining power (between employer and employee) which is 
inherent…in the employment relationship.”27 However this focus has 
shifted since the 1980s due to the changes in labour market policy and 
regulation, some of these changes were highlighted in the previous 
                                                 
25 The Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) generally prohibits agreements to be made across multiple 
businesses. It only allows such agreements in specific and rare circumstances. See ss 322 & 332 
26 In Australia see R. Mitchell Redefining Labour Law (Centre for Employment and Labour Relations 
Law, University of Melbourne, 1995) and in the United Kingdom see Bob Hepple The Future of 
Labour Law Industrial Law Journal Vol 24. No. 4 Dec 1995 and Barnard, Deakin & Morris The Future 
of Labour Law Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004  
27 Kahn-Freund O, Labour and the Law, Stevens and Sons, London, 1972, p8 
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section.  Many labour law scholars have argued that the role of labour law 
should be redefined to be the law of market regulation.28 This 
reorientation of the role of labour law brings it into line with the labour 
market reforms which have taken place in Australian since the 1980s. 
This then changes and opens up the parameters of labour law to include 
all aspects of labour market regulation. It would then “incorporate into 
the analysis…Certain features of commercial, competition, and company 
law may be relevant since they serve to define the legal form of the 
business enterprise.”29   
 
This redefinition also leads to a change in the objectives of labour law. 
The traditional focus on the protection of workers’ interests would not be 
ousted however it would require a “compromise of sorts with other 
economic and social goals and the state of labour law was thus always 
conditional on particular economic and social contexts.”30   However 
underlying most of the academic inquiry in this area is the search for 
adequate protection of workers’ rights within the corporate model and 
regulatory regime. In the writers’ view this traditional focus has not been 
altered by the redefinition of modern labour law. It is only the arena in 
                                                 
28 R. Mitchell Redefining Labour Law Centre for employment and labour relations law, University of 
Melbourne, 1995 and Arup, Gahan, Howe, Johnstone, Mitchell & O’Donnell, Labour Law and Labour 
Market Regulation, Essays on the Construction, Constitution and Regulation of labour markets and 
work relationships.  The Federation Press, Sydney , 2006 
29 Deakin & Wilkinson The Law of the Labour Market Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p2 
30 see n 23 Arup et al p 10  
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which the inquiry is conducted that has changed. The redefinition to 
labour market regulation does increase the complexity of labour law to 
include areas such as welfare, taxation and family law and most probably 
leads to confusion as to what the proper parameters of labour law should 
be.  This however does not mean that the redefinition is inadequate or 
wrong.  It enriches the study of this area of law and more significantly 
may come closer to providing solutions to larger problems which affect 
the economy and the labour force of our society.  
 
Labour law is not often the key focus of corporate law scholars.31 Much 
of this inquiry has been driven by labour scholars in their examination of 
the conditions and rights of workers in companies.   The focus of 
corporate law is multi-faceted however it does not appear to include 
examination of labour management and regulation within the corporate 
structure.  Even with the advent of employee share ownership schemes 
the areas of law seem to be segmented.32 Perhaps the reasons are that it 
has generally been understood that corporate law and labour law are 
separate fields of scholarship and regulatory policy.33 Some scholars have 
argued that a continued separation between the two fields is not even 
                                                 
31 see r. Mitchell et al n 2 at p38 
32 the Corporate law and Workplace Partnerships project at University of Melbourne have published 
some papers on the area  see J Lenne, R Mitchell and I Ramsay, ‘Employee Share Ownership Schemes 
in Australia: A Survey of Key Issues and Themes’ (Research Report, Corporate Governance and 
Workplace Partnerships project, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation and Centre for 
Employment and Labour Relations Law, University of Melbourne, May 2005). 
33 see above n 2 Hansmann p 589 and Mitchell et al p4 
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sustainable or desirable.34  It is evident that the pursuit of shareholder 
value by corporate management and decision makers has direct relevance 
to labour management issues and thus labour law scholars. The 
relationship is however “complex and paradoxical.”35  In order to 
understand some part of this relationship the underlying concepts of the 
company in Anglo-Australian law needs to be examined.  
 
Concepts of the company36
Scholars have noted that there is “no single understanding of the 
company [i]n the Anglo-[Australian] tradition.” 37   In this section of the 
paper, two models of the company will be examined. First the traditional, 
ownership model will be examined.  This view of the company regards 
shareholders as owners and perpetuates the pursuit of shareholder value 
above other stakeholders in the company.  This theory has been varied in 
modern times by the agency or nexus-of-contract theory.38 The theory 
conceives the company in contractual terms. The theory accepts that 
shareholders do not own the company.  However, ownership of their 
shares gives them the right, exclusive of other stakeholders to hold 
directors and managers of the company accountable. Shareholders are the 
                                                 
34 n 2 Mitchell et al p 4 
35 see note 24 essay by S. Deakin Workers Finance and Democracy p79 
36 much of the discussion refers to J Parkinson Models of the Company and the Employment 
Relationship British Journal of Industrial Relations 41:3 Sept 2003 pp 481-509 
37 ibid p481 
38 se E. Fama and M Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control (1983) 25 Journal of law and 
Economics 301  
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principals and management are their agents in the relationship.  The end 
result is that this theory still prefers maximisation of shareholder value as 
the appropriate goal of corporate governance.39 The second model which 
will be examined is the stakeholder model.  This model involves a 
balancing of interests of stakeholders, including employees.  
 
Some Basic Concepts defined 
Prior to examining the concepts of the company noted above, reference 
should be made to what is meant by two important terms that are often 
used without specific definition, namely shareholder value and/or 
primacy and corporate governance. 
 
Shareholder Value/Primacy 
Scholars have noted that the meaning of the terms shareholder value or 
primacy “is not immediately clear” as they are not strictly legal terms.40 
They are used by economists and policy-makers of corporate governance 
but they are not defined at law.  Further there is also considerable 
disagreement as to how shareholder value is to be delivered. Generally 
shareholder value is often interpreted as a management concept which is 
aimed at maximizing shareholder benefit.  This benefit is often defined by 
a strong focus on raising company earnings and the share price. However 
                                                 
39 see n33 p485-491 
40 see n34 p79.  
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in contrast to this there has been support for ‘enlightened shareholder 
value’ which implies an obligation upon management to maximise 
benefits to shareholders by taking into account a balanced view of the 
short and long term effects of all stakeholders of the company, such as 
labour.41  
 
Corporate Governance – Narrow and Broad 
 Corporate governance is used to describe all exercises of power mainly 
in large publicly listed companies. In its narrower sense it only considers 
corporate decision making as a function of shareholder primacy or value. 
This is the traditional legal understanding of corporate governance and 
consistent with the ownership model of the company.  Corporate 
governance in its broadest sense encompasses the stakeholder model of 
the company. This takes into account all influences that may bear upon 
company decision making and thus is not narrowed to considerations 
surrounding shareholder value.  
 
 Ownership Model   
The ownership model is based upon a proprietary view of the company. 
Shareholders are viewed as owners of the company and are thus entitled 
to insist that the company is run in their own interests. This is the 
                                                 
41 Ibid n 34 p81 
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justification used to invoke shareholder primacy in corporate governance 
decision making.  However “the idea that shareholders are owners in the 
legal sense…rests on a technical error.” 42 Shareholders do not own the 
assets of the company.  In fact they may be found guilty of theft if they 
take and use an asset of the company without proper authorisation.43 
Shareholders own their shares only. Certain proprietary and contractual 
rights flow from the incidence of ownership of the shares but that does 
not translate to ownership of the assets of the company or the company 
itself.  This holds true in publicly listed companies. The position maybe 
different in private companies where shares are closely held between 
management and shareholding.  The idea that shareholders own the 
company is a remnant from an earlier conception of the company which 
operated until the early nineteenth century.  This is when joint stock 
companies were seen as partnerships at law and shareholders were 
considered to have equitable ownership of the assets with managers as 
their agents.44  It is unclear why this remnant of the nineteenth century 
still has primacy in modern company law. Perhaps it is a convenient basis 
upon which to justify and pursue the shareholder model where primacy is 
given to shareholder value in corporate governance.  This model has been 
used to justify policy arguments in favour of corporate governance 
                                                 
42 n33 p483 
43 Blight v Brent (1837), 2 Y  & C Ex 268  
44 see Paddy Ireland, Capitalism without the Capitalist: The joint stock company share and the 
emergence of the doctrine of separate corporate personality 1996 17 Journal of Legal History 41 
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practice that act in accordance with the shareholder model.45   
 
Advocates of shareholder primacy have focused on the need to keep those 
in control of the company that is, the managers and directors accountable 
to shareholders.  There is a real risk of abuse of position and power. 
There are legal duties imposed upon office holders but that on its own is 
not sufficient given how widely the duties are defined.46 They give great 
discretion to office holders and the courts impose their own views only in 
extreme circumstances.  It is fair to say that the courts are reluctant to 
interfere into managerial decision making with regards to what is 
considered to be the best interests of the company.  The duties may not 
provide an effective check on managerial decision making.  However by 
making managers subject to shareholder value they are more likely to 
govern the company in the interests of shareholders and not their own 
interests.  Another justification has been used under the agency theory. 
Shareholders are considered to be best placed to monitor the company’s 
performance as they have the most to lose if the company does not 
perform. Other stakeholders such as employees have different objectives 
that may conflict with the company’s best interests such as job security 
and high wages.  
                                                 
45 see n33 p482 
46 see Chp 2D Corporations Act Cth (2001) 
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Stakeholder Theory 
This concept of the company is evident in civil law countries such as 
Germany and Japan.  In contrast with the shareholder model it conceives 
that the company must balance the interests of various stakeholders 
within the company.  This must be reflected in the company’s decision-
making.  However it presumes that managers are not able to do this as 
they have their own interests and thus stakeholders must have 
representation at the corporate governance level.  Under this system 
employees have board representation and there are mandatory 
consultation procedures with employees in place. This theory 
acknowledges labour as a valid stakeholder in corporate governance.  
 
Corporate Governance Practice in Australia 
In Australia, studies have shown that the corporate regime promotes the 
shareholder model and gives primacy to shareholder value.47  The 
Australian regulatory regime does not promote the stakeholder model of 
the company.  Workers are the outsiders in this model.   It is unlikely that 
such a model would be put in place in Australia. There would need to be 
radical changes to the Australian regulatory regime to allow for this 
model.  Effectively non-shareholder interests are being incorporated into 
the corporate governance structure.  
                                                 
47 see R. Mitchell et al n2 at p12 
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Labour interests however can be incorporated in the current corporate 
governance structure as we understand it in Australia. This is done 
without resort to radical changes to the system.  In spite of shareholder 
primacy, the shareholder model does not oust the ability of management 
to practice corporate governance that leads to favourable labour 
outcomes.  Labour interests can be incorporated in decisions that reflect 
‘the best interests of the company’.  In practice some scholars have noted 
that there is little difference between the best interests of the company 
and the best interests of shareholders.48 The legal duties imposed upon 
management and office holders are general enough to give discretion to 
corporate decision makers.  Management can and do define the long term 
interests of the company, one of those interests is the investment of a 
skilled work force within the company and for the general protection of 
workers’ rights.  Bad publicity associated with mass sackings and 
restructures do not generally lead to public or shareholder approval.  
Long term maximisation of shareholder wealth may not be satisfied by 
short-term profit gains associated with a reduction in the workforce and in 
employment benefits generally.  In the United Kingdom scholars have 
noted that the positive long term “economic advantages which flow from 
                                                 
48 R. Mitchell at al n2 p15 
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cooperation between labour and management are now generally 
understood.”49  
 
The need for increased worker protection has also caused labour law 
scholars to draw upon corporate social responsibility CSR principles. 
CSR principles are theoretically incorporated into the directors’ duty of 
the ‘best interests of the company’.   It has been noted though that 
employees have received very little attention in the corporate governance 
debate.50 This is the case in relation to corporate social responsibility 
aspects of corporate governance practice.  Much of the debate has 
focused upon the environmental impact of corporate behaviour.  Certainly 
with the urgency created by the global warming issue corporations are 
increasingly concerned with the environment.  Labour standards seem to 
be taking a backseat in the debate.   The adherence to corporate social 
responsibility principles is largely voluntary in Australia. There is no 
mention of it in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).  It will most likely stay 
that way if the present government follows the findings of CAMAC’s 
latest report released in December 2006.51 The CAMAC report in essence 
reinforced the current corporate governance framework as an adequate 
basis for ensuring that companies act in a socially responsible way, 
                                                 
49 Deakin & Wilkinson  n 24 p338 
50 Bottomley & Forsyth, The New Corporate Law , Corporate law & Accountability Research Group 
Working Paper June 2006, Monash University, p21 
51 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee The social responsibility of Corporations Dec 2006 
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meeting international standards in this regard.  There are various 
guidelines and instruments which may be followed by Australian 
companies and accords with best practice with respect to the management 
of labour.  For example, there are the Australian Stock Exchange ten best 
practice corporate governance principles which recognise the value to 
companies of human capital.52  These voluntary guidelines serve to bring 
some attention to employment or labour matters.  However given the 
voluntary nature of the guidelines their effectiveness in strengthening 
workers’ rights is hard to assess.  There is certainly no mandatory 
obligation upon management in this area.  Some companies such as BHP 
and Rio Tinto have adopted CSR principles relating to employment 
practices in their management strategies.  However recent studies have 
shown that although there is a general commitment to these strategies 
there is little evidence of a deeper level of commitment in the actual 
workplace in these companies.53 A cynical observer may comment that 
adherence to responsible corporate practices in the area of labour is 
merely lip service.  
 
A reality commented by corporate law scholars in this debate is that 
managers are driven to deliver shareholder value which has inevitably 
meant that short-term gain overrides any long-term investment which 
                                                 
52 For a more detailed list of instruments and guidelines see n14 Jones et al p58 
53 Ibid  
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strengthens workers’ rights.  This has translated into delivering pure 
financial gain to the exclusion of the consideration of the effects on other 
stakeholders such as workers. 54  The recent CAMAC report on social 
responsibility notes that consideration of non financial interests in 
corporate governance will ultimately enhance the commercial outcomes 




This paper has surveyed some of the issues that concern labour law 
scholars in the context of corporate governance in Australia. The brevity 
of the paper provides a summary only and a means of generating some 
discussion.  The paper does not examine other areas of concern such as 
the vulnerability of workers’ entitlements when a corporation collapses or 
when companies re-structure.  It arguably paints a grim picture for labour 
it the corporate context. The investigation however does not end here as 






                                                 
54 see n 36 Parkinson at p494 and n50 Bottomley & Forsyth  
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